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Fideism is a commonly used term in philosophy of religion and 
philosophical theology, and most people think that they know what they 
are referring to by it. The basic idea seems to be that in order to qualify 
as a fideist, one must believe that religious propositions are not believed 
on the basis of reasons, or some other type of evidence, but because 
of something else, perhaps trust or some sort of inchoate experience. 
In these contexts, fideism is normally used as a blunt instrument, as 
it were, to silence the opposition. but what does it really mean to be 
a fideist? Were Tertullian and Kierkegaard, for instance, really fideists, 
as ften claimed? In his latest study, Beyond Fideism: Negotiable Religious 
Identities, olli-Pekka Vainio attempts to answer these questions. Beyond 
Fideism (henceforth bF), however, is not simply about fideism. For 
Vainio, the question of fideism is a question about theological method 
and the relationship of reason and faith therein. This leads him to analyse 
different ways in which contemporary (and sometimes self-consciously 
postmodern) theologians understand theology. Finally, bF develops 
a novel way to understand religious rationality and religious identity. 
Current discussions and debates have their roots in the postliberal or 
post-foundationalist turn in theological method in 1980s. bF can best be 
seen as a part of this ongoing debate about faith and reason in theology.
bF consists of four, somewhat independent, parts. The first part is 
a historical look into Christian thinkers usually taken to be prototypes 
of fideism. Vainio examines such diverse theologians and philosophers 
as St. Paul, Tertullian, blaise Pascal and Alvin Plantinga. What Vainio 
aims to do here is to show that how the thinkers view faith and reason 
is much more complicated than ordinarily assumed. In Vainio’s view, if 
fideism means that faith goes beyond what reason can prove, then most 
Christian theologians and philosophers from Aquinas to Plantinga 
are fideists. If, on the other hand, fideism means that one must believe 
religious propositions against the deliverances of reason or without any 
evidence, then no one is really a fideist. even with Kierkegaard and 
Tertullian, religious faith is an attitude grounded in some kind of reasons 
or evidence.
266 booK reVIeWS AND NoTICeS
First of all, Vainio points out how philosophically loaded and 
historically contingent the notions of “knowledge”, “reason” and “faith” 
are. These concepts change from one historical period to another and 
we must be sensitive to this. In the biblical parlance, faith is an attitude 
akin to faithfulness to a message or a person, not an attitude that is 
adopted without good evidence. Similarly, although both Tertullian and 
Pascal were sceptical of the ability of reason to obtain religious truths, 
they did not think that reason and faith were in opposition. According 
to Vainio, Tertullian was well versed in logic and philosophy of his day 
and constantly used publicly accessible arguments and natural theology 
against his Christian and non-Christian opponents. Tertullian was 
critical of certain secular philosophies of his day, but not of reason per 
se. This point of view was also shared by Pascal, who was sceptical of 
reason’s ability to obtain truths about God. The point that Pascal wanted 
to make with his Wager arguments, Vainio argues, was not that one 
should believe in God because of the practical benefits of believing, but 
that no inquiry should be a matter of reason only. both Christians and 
non-Christians supplement reason with passion and experience. This 
is something that contemporary “fideists” such as Plantinga and his 
Reformed Epistemology also emphasise: the idea that all justified beliefs 
must be grounded in incorrigible basic beliefs makes most beliefs, not 
just religious beliefs, irrational. We must be more lenient in what we 
allow into the foundation of our belief-structure. Consciously accessible 
reasons and evidence come in when we assess the defeaters and counter-
evidence for our basic beliefs.
bF basically argues that fideism comes in degrees. Conformist 
fideism is a sceptical position according to which, since there are no 
reasonable criteria for assessing evidence or reasons, people should 
just believe what others believe. This, again, is a position not seen in 
Christian philosophical and theological traditions. Thinkers such 
as Plantinga, Pascal and Tertullian represent a view that Vainio calls 
communicative fideism. Communicative fideists think that (1) religious 
beliefs and religious language can and should be understandable “from 
the outside”, (2) that the Christian world-view can reasonably engage 
with other world-views and (3) that truth can be understood in terms 
of correspondence. According to communicative fideism the act of faith 
needs to rationally warranted, although the object of faith itself is beyond 
the reach of reason. In this sense, reason can be used to clarify the object 
of faith and support the act of faith.
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In the second part, Vainio examines the postliberal turn in theological 
method and the epistemological developments that led to it. This section 
is quite brief and is meant to provide a general introduction to the 
philosophical critique of classical foundationalism in epistemology and to 
the development of postliberal theological method from its inception in 
the early 1980s until today. Vainio traces the postliberal turn in theology 
to the downfall of classical foundationalism, according to which all 
beliefs (in order to be justified) need to be grounded in basic beliefs that 
are somehow incorrigible or infallible. both postfoundationalism and 
antifoundationalism reject this basic claim and argue that we do not have 
incorrigible or infallible basic beliefs. Instead, we should take our basic 
beliefs as fallible and situated in a specific context. From the rejection of 
classical foundationalism, it follows that there is no universal foundation 
for knowledge, but instead knowing (theological knowing too) takes 
place in a specific cultural and historical context. In philosophy, this 
development led (in conjunction with other factors) to the emergence of 
communitarianism and pragmatism. many theologians allied themselves 
with these developments and opened a new space for theological and 
religious rationality that was not subjected to some sort of universal 
or infallible “reason”. George lindbeck’s The Nature of Doctrine (1984) 
became a catalyst for these developments as lindbeck argued that 
theological doctrines can be understood as second-order discourse, that 
is, rules of first-order religious language in a religious community. many 
other theologians, such as Stanley Hauerwas and Hans Frei, were also 
inspired by these developments.
The third part provides an overview of contemporary, post Lindbeckian, 
theological methods from the point of view of how reason and faith 
are understood in them. Vainio aims to develop a more analytically 
sophisticated description of contemporary theological methods than the 
standard descriptions of Hans Frei (Types of Christian Theology, 1992) and 
robert Greer (Mapping Postmodernism: A Survey of Christian Options, 
2003). Vainio distinguishes four different poles of gravity towards which 
theological methods tend to gravitate: Traditionalism, Descriptionism, 
revisionism and Correlationism. What all these models of theological 
method share is a commitment to the idea that there are no neutral and 
universal criteria for rationality. In such a postmodern context, different 
theological methods provide different solutions regarding the goals, 
function and philosophical assumptions undergirding theology.
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In Traditionalism, the goal is to preserve the identity of church and 
Christian tradition. Traditionalists, such as robert Jenson, David bentley 
Hart and bruce marshall, situate themselves in the tradition of Karl barth 
and support a kind of moderate foundationalism: the Christian tradition 
needs no outside justification. Although natural theology is somewhat 
frowned upon, philosophy is used ad hoc to clarify theology and 
explain the content of the Christian message to outsiders. Diametrically 
opposite to Traditionalism, there is the more pragmatically oriented 
Revisionism, which privileges political, moral and other types of goals 
over the preservation of tradition. Although the Traditionalist rejects the 
idea that there is universal reason, she still understands truth by way of 
correspondence and holds onto some kind of metaphysical (or internal) 
realism. revisionist theologies, among which Vainio includes feminist 
theologies (e.g., mary Daly and Grace Jantzen), deconstructionist 
theologies (e.g., Gordon Kauffman, Don Cupitt) and many others, 
usually abandon truth as correspondence and metaphysical realism. 
reality is something for us to deconstruct and reconstruct according to 
our goals.
revisionism is close to another pole of gravity that Vainio calls 
Descriptivism. The Descriptivist seeks to distance herself from theological 
debates and describe religious and theological use of language from 
a kind of disinterested or neutral position. The philosopher D. Z. Phillips 
is the paradigmatic case here. Inspired by Wittgenstein, Phillips sees 
the meaning of all language grounded in the form of life in which its 
users live. The realism/anti-realism debate that goes on in philosophical 
theology is fundamentally flawed because we cannot really compare 
languages across different forms of life.
This leaves one more pole of gravity, Correlationism. Theologians, 
such as Wolfhart Pannenberg, Alister mcGrath and J. Wentzel van 
Huyssteen, prioritise the Christian tradition, but aim to build bridges 
between traditions and different forms of rationality. Van Huyssteen, for 
instance, talks about postfoundationalist or transversal rationality that 
identifies a common core in the ways in which we acquire knowledge in 
different domains. Correlationists tend to be more optimistic towards 
natural theology than Traditionalists or revisionists, and usually hold 
onto ontological realism and truth as correspondence. Since most 
writers in this camp have sympathies towards a specifically critical realist 
understanding of theology (ontological realism and fallibilism), they 
have found it easy to engage with the sciences from a theological point 
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of view. especially mcGrath and van Huyssteen have done pioneering 
work in this area. The goal here is not to justify the Christian message 
from the outside, but instead engage in a conversation that shows to the 
non-Christian how the Christian message “resonates” (a term coined by 
mcGrath) with non-Christian worldviews and rationalities.
Finally, the fourth section of bF is where Vainio does most of his 
constructive heavy lifting. Here he presents a model of religious rationality 
and identity. According to Vainio, an acceptable theory of  religious 
rationality should allow for at least the following possibilities: religious 
language and worldview can be intellectually understandable “from the 
outside”, religious traditions can be open to conversation and can engage 
in a non-violent dialogue with other traditions and allow the growth of 
wisdom and new insights that can shape the tradition from the inside.
Vainio argues that religious rationality should be connected with what 
he calls negotiable identities. by negotiability, Vainio means an open-
ended process of theological reflection and deliberation that is based on 
the core identity and beliefs of the community. The core identity of the 
Christian community, he claims, is based on the Christ-event, that is, the 
event in which God became a man in history. Since this is a historical 
event, the identity of a contemporary Christian is always a mediated 
identity that is based on the canonical witness of biblical authors and 
the Christian tradition which has been intertwined with philosophies 
and worldviews of different times. Christian beliefs, therefore, have 
their grounding in the experiences and historical contingencies of the 
Christian tradition. This is the reason why they cannot be given a simple 
synchronic justification in terms of, e.g., a complete system of natural 
theology. Although Vainio’s model is fallibilistic (included in the idea of 
negotiability), there is room for strong identities. religious commitment 
is not disinterested in the same way as most scientific commitments, for 
instance, are. most of the time, taking a disinterested view or remaining 
agnostic is not a live option. being a fallibilist does not mean that one 
should only hold beliefs tentatively, but instead it means that you are 
open to the possibility of defeating evidence. Finally, negotiable identity 
necessarily involves personal growth in the virtues of humility and 
courage.
bF succeeds in covering an enormous amount of debate and 
discussions in theology in a relatively short space (only 184 pages). It 
still has its problems, however. one problem is that bF is somewhat 
fragmented. The first part does not fit in well with the rest. In the first 
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part, the focus is on how faith and reason have been understood and what 
subtypes of fideism there are. In the other parts, Vainio seldom mentions 
fideism and mostly talks about theological method in a broader sense, 
not just in terms of the relationship between faith and reason. At least the 
first and second chapter of the book could have simply been published as 
separate, although relatively long, journal articles. The second problem 
of bF is its generality. especially in his discussions of different theological 
methods, Vainio seldom engages in a close scrutiny of the views of 
particular theologians and philosophers. Perhaps this is not necessary 
for categorisation, but it leaves the reader, who is not familiar with these 
theologians and philosophers, in a position in which it is difficult to 
assess whether Vainio’s categorisations are accurate. However, a close 
reading of all the writers Vainio discusses would have produced a much 
bigger and more cumbersome book. Vainio also omits certain important 
traditions from his analysis completely. I understand that his aim is to 
discuss postmodern and postliberal developments in the context of 
Protestant theology, but contemporary Thomism and its many variants 
might have been discussed more extensively as they present a somewhat 
different kind of solution to the problems of postmodern theology. 
Further, Vainio does indeed mention hard (and soft) rationalism and 
their adherents in philosophy of religion and philosophical theology (e.g., 
richard Swinburne), but bF does not really deal with how they criticise 
contemporary theology and seek to remedy its problems in any detail. 
A look into these arguments would have made the book’s treatment of 
the philosophical theology of the last decade more balanced.
Despite the problems that have to do with generality and 
fragmentation, Vainio succeeds in providing the reader with a road 
map that introduces the reader to a great number of recent discussions 
and debates concerning theological method in a concise way. Given the 
philosophical lucidity of Vainio’s analysis, his book will be very useful 
to philosophers who seek to understand the contemporary theological 
scene.
